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PROTECTING CRITICAL DATABASES – TOWARDS A RISK BASED 
ASSESSMENT OF CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURES (CIIS) IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
MN Njotini
* 
 
1  Introduction  
 
South Africa has long recognised the need to protect critical infrastructures (CIs). 
For  example,  legislations  such  as  the  Defence  Act
1  and  the  National  Strategic 
Intelligence  Act
2  contain  measures  that,  amongst  others,  guarantee  the 
safeguarding  of  CIs.  More  specifically,  the  Defence  Act  requires  the  gathering, 
collating, evaluating  and using  of strategic intelligence related  inter alia  to  the 
security of South Africa.
3 The strategic intelligence is gathered, collated, evaluated 
and used in order to assess the attacks or threats of attacks to the security of South 
Africa’s CIs.
4 In general, CIs encompass structural and physical places or areas that 
are of strategic interest to a country,
5  places or areas that are vital to the country’s 
safety and security and the wellbeing of its citizens.
6 Examples of CIs include inter 
alia  petro-chemical  stores  ( eg  pump  stations  and  oil  refineries),  international 
airports, the reserve bank, electricity distribution stations, strategic power stations, 
and water storage and distribution facilities. Attacks or threats of attacks to CIs have 
in  the  recent past  proved  to be real and pervasive.  These attacks or threats of 
attacks can take various forms. For example, CIs can be damaged or  destroyed by 
deliberate acts of terrorism, natural disasters, negligence or malicious behaviour.
7 
Two independent attacks to CIs are described below in illustration. The first was an 
                                                 
*   Mzukisi  Niven  Njotini.  LLB,  (Vista  University),  LLM  Cum  Laude:  Information  Technology  Law, 
(University  of  South  Africa),  LLD  Candidate,  (University  of  South  Africa).  Senior  Lecturer, 
Department  of  Jurisprudence,  College  of  Law:  University  of  South  Africa.  Email: 
njotim@unisa.ac.za. 
1   Defence Act 42 of 2002. 
2   National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994. 
3   Section 34(a) Defence Act 42 of 2002. 
4   Section 1(xvi) National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994. 
5   Section 1 National Key Points Act 102 of 1980. 
6   Section 1 read with s 2 National Key Points Act 102 of 1980. 
7   Commission of the European Communities 2006 http://bit.ly/Z497fe. MN NJOTINI    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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attack  that  on  parts  of  the  United  States  of  America  (the  US)  and  Canada.  It 
occurred during August 2003 and targeted the Eastern Seaboard Power Plant, which 
transmits electricity to certain parts of the US and Canada.
8 It caused power outages 
to an area of about 50 million people consisting of nine US states and  the Canadian 
province of Ontario.
9 As a result of these outages, an amount estimated at 12 billion 
US dollars is reported to have been lost.
10 The second attack was a security breach 
in the Oak Ridge nuclear plant in the US  (the Y-12 National Security Complex). In 
this instance, the attackers are reported to have targeted an area adjacent to the 
Highly  Enriched  Uranium  Materials  Facility  (HEUMF).
11  The  HEUMF  keeps  large 
amounts of uranium, which is used during the process leading to the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons.
12 Despite the fact that no harm was done to the HEUMF, it is 
accepted that the attack could have had catastrophic consequences.
13  
 
The  emergence of novel technologies (ICTs), for example, the Internet and the 
World Wide Web or the Web, has changed the rules of the game regarding the 
safeguarding  of  CIs .  ICTs  can  be  used  as  a  vehicle  to  foster  socio -economic 
development.  Some  are  essential  in  c onducting  business  and  exchanging 
information
14 by or between governments, businesses or individual ICT users , thus 
facilitating the establishment of our information society,
15 which enjoys the benefits 
inter alia of cheaper and faster access to ICTs; the pr ovision of digital content for 
                                                 
8   US-Canada Power System Outage Task Force 2004 http://1.usa.gov/10t19NH. 
9   Anderson  et  al  2005  IEEE  Transactions  on  Power  Systems   1922;  VandenBrink  2011 
http://bit.ly/Yr6ok9. 
10   US-Canada Power System Outage Task Force 2004 http://1.usa.gov/10t19NH. 
11   US Department of Energy 2012 http://1.usa.gov/XmvVwl. 
12   US Department of Energy 2012 http://1.usa.gov/XmvVwl. 
13   US Department of Energy 2012 http://1.usa.gov/XmvVwl. 
14   The term information means a "piece of news with a meaning for the recipient; its assimilation 
usually causes a change within the recipient" (see Sieber "Emergence of Information Law"  10-
11). 
15   Dissimilar definitions of the concept  "information society" have emerged, each being influenced 
by  various  technological,  economic,  spatial  and  cultural  developments  over  the  years  (see 
Webster Theories 8-25). For the purposes of this research, the concept "information society" 
mean a society that is "characterised by a high level of information intensity in the everyday lives 
of most citizens, in most organisations and workplaces, by the use of common or compatible 
technology for a wide range of personal, social, educational or business activi ties, and by the 
ability to transmit, receive and exchange digital data rapidly between places irrespective of 
distance" (Durrani Information and Liberation 256).  MN NJOTINI    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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worldwide networks,
16 and the acceleration of electronic commerce (e-commerce).
17 
The ease  of accessing  recent ICTs results  in  or can result in the emergence of 
certain risks that weaken the security and stability of the information society. These 
include,  amongst  others,  dishonesty,  the  illicit  revelation  of  secret  information , 
corruption,  theft,  deliberate  disruption  of  the  system ,  the  destruction  of  ICT 
resources, and cyber-terrorism.
18 These risks demand that the information or data
19 
recoded or kept on computers or computer software be safeguarded,
20 through the 
establishment of a dedicated information security structure referred to as  a critical 
information infrastructure (CII).
21  CIIs  generally  form  part  of  a  country’s  overall 
cyber-infrastructure.
22  CIIs  guard  the  various information systems
23  or networks 
that, if disrupted or destr oyed, could have a prejudicial  or adverse  impact on the 
health, safety, security and monetary well -being of the citizens of a country or on 
the effective functioning or performance of a government or economy.
24  
 
Countries  such as  the  US  and Canada recognise the importance of safeguarding 
CIIs. More specifically, the US has framed a number of statutes in response to the 
attacks or threats of attacks  on its CIIs. These  include the  Computer Fraud and 
                                                 
16   A network is an "intricately connected system of things or people." See Milone 2002 Business 
Lawyer 383. 
17   See  Council  of  the  European  Union  and  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  2000 
http://bit.ly/YZQlMX. 
18   For  an  interesting  definition  of  the  term  "cyber -terrorism",  see  Denning  2000 
http://bit.ly/16rUw3i. 
19   The meaning of the term "data" in this context is different from that in the more usual context of 
computer data. Here the term data means  the electronic representation of information in any 
form. See s 1 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (the ECT Act). 
For further interesting reading, see the  Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime (2001). 
This paper argues that the provisions of the Electronic Communications Security Pty (Ltd) Act 68 
of 2002 may also be of assistance to the general scheme of securing CII. However, this paper 
examines the provisions of the ECT Act. 
20   Katyal 2001 U Pa L Rev 1003-1006. 
21   This paper acknowledges that information safeguarding extends beyond CIIs. In particular, 
information protection also encompasses  inter alia  authentication or validation and identity 
management processes. 
22   Okhravi et al 2012 IJCIP 30. 
23   Article 1(a) of the  Council of the European Union Framework Decision on Attacks Against 
Information  Systems   (2005)  [hereinafter  referred  to  as  Council  Framework  Decision 
2005/222/JHA] defines an information system as any device or group of inter -connected or 
related devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a programme, performs automatic processing 
of computer data, as well as computer data stored, processed, re trieved or transmitted by them 
for purposes of their operation, use, protection or maintenance.  
24   Bendisch et al "Towards a European Agenda" 1-2; Van Niekerk and Maharaj 2011 South African 
Journal of Military Studies 101. MN NJOTINI    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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Abuse Act, 1986, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, 2001 (the so-called USA 
Patriotic Act), the Cyber Security Enhancement Act, 2002 and the Cyber Security 
Research  and  Development  Act,  2002.  Furthermore,  a  number  of  international 
organisations, eg the United Nations (the UN) and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation  and  Development  (the  OECD)
25  promote the need to safeguard   CIIs. 
South  Africa  follows  the  approaches  that  are  adopted  by  these  countries  or 
organisations.  South  Africa  particularly  utilises  its  national  key   points’  security 
framework as a model to protect CIIs. This framework is set out in the National Key 
Points  Act  as  amended.  This  paper  investigates  the  South  African  approach  to 
safeguarding CIIs to establish whether the South African framework is comparable 
to those of its international counterparts. In doing so, the OECD approach to secure 
CIIs will be used as a guide.  The rationale  is to establish  inconsistencies and/or 
inadequacies, if there are any, in South Africa’s CII protection framework.  
 
The structure of the paper is straightforward: Section 2 discusses the notion "critical 
databases". The analysis includes an examination of a number of concepts that have 
relevance  to  the  study  of  critical  databases.  Section  3  describes  the  different 
approaches to the safeguarding of critical databases. The approaches adopted and 
implemented by the OECD and South Africa, amongst others, will be investigated. 
Section 4 investigates the importance of the risk-based approach to safeguarding 
CIIs. Lastly, section 5 of this paper draws conclusions. 
 
2  Critical databases 
 
2.1  Background to the study 
 
It  is  difficult  to  give  a  concise  and  accurate  description  of  the  term  "critical 
database".  Any  attempt  to  do  so  should  probably  begin  with  scrutinising  the 
                                                 
25   The OECD is formally referred to as the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation or 
OEEC. It is an intergovernmental body that was established in 1961. The OECD currently has 34 
member  countries  that  continuously  identify,  discuss  and  analyse  global  challenges  and 
problems, and promote policies to address those challenges and solve those problems. MN NJOTINI    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
 
455 / 536 
 
meaning  of  the  word  "database"  itself.  Botma  et  al  define  a  database  as  an 
organised  collection  of  electronic  software  or  tools  that  is  used  to  store 
information.
26  This  collection  facilitates  the  accessing ,  retrieving  and  using  of 
information or documents that are  stored in databases.
27 Databases usually consist 
of data and metadata.
28 On the one hand, t he term data refers to th e electronic 
representation of information in any form.
29  The  notion  "any form"  is  generally 
misleading.  It is submitted,  however,  that information  can be  represented either 
manually or mechanically. However, this representation should, insofar as it amounts 
to a processing of information or data, meet the principles regarding the protection 
of personal information.
30 The requirements relate to processing limitations, purpose 
specifications, further processing limitations, information or data quality, opennes s, 
security safeguards, individual participation and accountability.
31 On the other hand, 
metadata encompasses data or information which describes the structure of the data 
within a database.
32  
 
It is furthermore accepted that p articular databases are generally more critical or 
more important than others. The criticality of these databases therefore makes them 
susceptible  or  vulnerable  to  outside  attack s.  Examples  of  outside  attacks  are 
computer hacking
33, pharming or spoofing
34, phishing
35 and cyber-terrorism. Outside 
                                                 
26   Botma  et  al  Navigating  Information  Literacy  84.  For  further  interesting  reading,  see  Brown, 
Bryan and Conley 1999 http://bit.ly/16rT8h8 2-6. 
27   Botma et al Navigating Information Literacy 6. 
28   Taylor SQL for Dummies 9. 
29   See s 1 of the ECT Act. 
30   See Chapter 3 of the Protection of Personal Information Bill, 1998. 
31   Principle 1-8 of the Protection of Personal Information Bill, 1998. 
32   Taylor SQL for Dummies 9. 
33   Hacking is one of  the techniques that are employed by criminals to compromise personal or 
sensitive information stored in a computer system or network. Hacking is actually an act of 
illegally breaking into other people’s computer systems or networks for purposes of soliciting 
information  or  data  that  is  stored  or  reserved  in  the  systems  or  networks  (see  Taylor 
"Hacktivism" 61; McAfee Date unknown http://bit.ly/11d0cwJ). 
34   Pharming  or  spoofing  is  performed  by  a  "mechanical  vandal  that  creates  a  fake  site 
masquerading as tha t of a legitimate provider" in order to steal information or data from 
unsuspecting persons and/or disrupt operating businesses (see Kapoor  Computerised Banking 
16).  
35   Various definitions of the crime of phishing diverge. The differences seems to be infl uenced by 
the ever-changing nature of contemporary forms of technologies. For example, Myers provides 
that phishing encompasses social engineering and/or technical attacks (see Myers "Introduction 
to Phishing" 1-2.) Such attacks are commonly orchestrated by the sending of electronic mails to 
a web user falsely claiming to be an established legitimate enterprise, in an attempt to scam the MN NJOTINI    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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attacks generally rely on nefarious techniques or attacks to weaken the integrity of 
these  databases.  Furthermore,  outside  attacks  commonly  inhibit  the  quality  of 
databases and data.
36 Outside attacks can generally be classified as either passive or 
active attacks.
37 Passive attacks occur in cases where an e -system or network is 
infiltrated surreptitiously and without detection.
38  Active attacks take  the form of 
altering or adapting an e-system or network.
39 
 
Critical databases are collections of critical data in an electronic form kept in a site 
from where the data may be accessed, reproduced or extracted.
40 In South Africa, 
critical data is that the protection of  which is declared by the Minister
41 to be of 
importance to national security or the economic or social well-being of its citizens.
42 
This  includes  data  that  is  essential  to  the  daily  functioning  of  an  information 
society.
43 Furthermore, critical databases include data the interruption or destruction 
of which could have widespread effects and consequently result in or generate grave 
consequences to an information society.
44 At a governmental level, an  interruption 
or  destruction  of  critical  databases  could  hamper   and/or  delay  the  delivery  of 
services.
45 
 
The  critical  nature  of  databases  requires  the  taking  of  steps  to  preserve  the ir 
integrity and quality. Their preservation is often guarded in ordered to alleviate the 
impact  of  outside  attacks.   The  steps  to  preserve  the  integrity  and  quality  of 
databases are discussed in the section below. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
web user into surrendering private information that will be used for identity theft (see Granova 
and Eloff 2005 Computer Fraud and Security 6). 
36   West "Preventing System Intrusions" 39. 
37   West "Preventing System Intrusions" 39. 
38   West "Preventing System Intrusions" 39. 
39   West "Preventing System Intrusions" 39. 
40   Section 1 of the ECT Act.  
41   The relevant Minister is the Minister of Communications. 
42   See s 1 of the ECT Act. 
43   Milone 2002 Business Lawyer 383-384. 
44   Von Solms "Critical Information Infrastructure Protection" 37. 
45   Chapter 5, Part II, Principle A of Procl R1 in GG 21951 of 1 January 2001. MN NJOTINI    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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2.2  Protecting critical databases  
 
In modern times, attacks or threats of attacks to critical databases have become 
more pervasive and widespread. It is argued that these attacks or threats existed 
long before the 9/11 attacks that occurred in the US.
46 For example, the attacks that 
are alleged in the Riggs case took place during September 1988. An accused (Riggs 
and  another)  devised  a  scheme  in  order  to  defraud  a  company  (Bell  South 
Telephone Company) that provides telephone services to numerous states in the 
US.
47 In this case a computer was used to gain unlawful access to the company’s 
computer system and networks. When access was gained the accused downloaded a 
computer  file  that  contained  sensitive  information.  The  information  detailed  the 
manner in which emergency calls by the police, fire brigade, ambulance and other 
municipal emergency services by were responded to.
48 
 
It is furthermore argued that the hacker attacks on various databases such as those 
of the Bank of America
49 and the state-owned oil company in Saudi Arabia
50 reveal 
that the threats posed by outside attacks to  the integrity and quality of databases  
still  exists.  In  particular,  the  US  Industrial  Control  Systems  Cyber  Emergency 
Response Team Control Systems Program (ICS-CERT) details the gravity of the se 
outside attacks.
51 For example, the ICS-CERT enunciates that a total of 198 attacks 
to some of the critical databases in the US were reported during 2011.
52  It is 
therefore submitted that the interconnectedness  of modern societies can increase 
the  mayhem  that could be caused by   outside attacks.  An attack  on  a particular 
database could have adverse effects on other databases. In  some cases, an attack 
on one country’s database(s) could have pervasive consequences on the databases 
of other countries. 
                                                 
46   See in general United States v Robert J Riggs 739 FSupp 414 (North District of Illinois 1990); 
United States v Morris 928 F2N 504 (2nd Circuit Court 1991). 
47   United States v Robert J Riggs 739 FSupp 414 (North District of Illinois 1990) 45-46. 
48   United States v Robert J Riggs 739 FSupp 414 (North District of Illinois 1990) 45-46. 
49   Francis 2012 http://abcn.ws/ZwFUJH; Fikle and Fikle and Rothacker 2012 http://reut.rs/179qwdK 
2012. 
50   Perlroth 2012 http://nyti.ms/13M0EWG. 
51   ICS-CERT 2009-2011 http://1.usa.gov/16fCWxp. 
52   ICS-CERT 2009-2011 http://1.usa.gov/16fCWxp. MN NJOTINI    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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A scrutiny of the protection paradigms of critical databases reveals that they are 
generally only as strong as their weakest elements.
53 Put differently, outside attacks 
will continue to take place as long as technologies continue to develop.
54 The OECD 
recognises this fact, which is why it  developed an all-encompassing framework to 
alleviate  the attacks to critical databases .
55  In the terminology  of the OECD the 
measures are referred to as the structure to protect CIIs.  
 
Section 3 below is divided into two parts. Part 3.1 discusses the OECD structure to 
protect CIIs. Part 3.2 reviews the South African approach to safeguarding CIIs. 
 
3  Approaches to securing CIIs 
 
3.1  The OECD approach 
 
The OECD framework to protect CIIs has four essential components or elements,
56 
namely  prevention,  detection,  response  and  recovery.   No  particular  order  is 
necessarily  followed  in  addressing  each  of  these   elements,  but  it  is  generally  
accepted that each one element builds on the others.
57 This paper therefore delves 
into the meaning and importance of these elements in  relation to the safeguarding 
of CIIs. 
 
3.1.1  Prevention  
 
Various provisions of the Marsh Report
58 are essential to the element of prevention. 
For example,  the Marsh Report states that  "waiting for disaster (to happen) is a 
                                                 
53   Commission of the European Communities 2006 http://bit.ly/Z497fe. 
54   Commission of the European Communities 2006 http://bit.ly/Z497fe. 
55   OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
56   OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG.   
57   Cukier 2005 http://bit.ly/179q6UO. 
58   The  Marsh  Report  is  the  product  of   the  United  States  of  America  (t he  US)  President’s 
Commission  on  Critical  Information  Infrastructure  Protection  (President’s  Commission).  The 
President’s Commission was set up by the then US president (President Clinton) and Robert T 
Marsh was appointed as the chairman of the Commission. See Marsh 1997 http://bit.ly/Z4cWkx.  MN NJOTINI    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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dangerous strategy."
59 The real-time prevention of attacks on the CIIs must occur. 
This immediate security should be aimed at  preventing future attacks, as well as 
thwarting present attacks.
60 The OECD concurred, and therefore adopted a range of 
recommendations made in the Marsh Report. For example, the OECD promotes the 
adoption of clear and objective policies related to the prevention of  attacks (cyber-
attacks)  on  CIIs.
61  These  policies  are designed  to  encourage co-operation by or 
between countries, and by or between countries and  the private sector.
62 The co-
operation must  therefore  be at the strategy, policy and operational levels.
63 This 
collaboration must facilitate the initiating of a practice that enables the apportioning 
of skills to ascertain generic vulnerabilities of and risks to CIIs. Secondly, the policies 
must support the aspiration to dispense knowledge and experience regarding the 
development of policies and practices to secure CIIs.
64  
 
The OECD further acknowledges that the creation of awareness of the various risks 
to CIIs is one of the "lines of defence" for any CII protection paradigm.
65 Awareness 
extends to ascertaining the  degree and  significance of the risks to CIIs.
66  The 
rationale for the creation of the awareness is to motivate the design of CII security 
mechanisms that address and/or respond to the imminent risks.
67 
 
3.1.2  Detection 
 
The OECD recommends that a country’s or an organisation’s overall CII protection 
framework should encompass measures to identify and classify the risks of attacks 
to CIIs.
68 This identification and classification ought to extend to CIIs that are most 
                                                 
59   Marsh 1997 http://bit.ly/Z4cWkx 6. 
60   Marsh 1997 http://bit.ly/Z4cWkx 6. 
61   OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
62   OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
63   OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh. 
64   OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
65   See G8 2003 http://bit.ly/128xThV. 
66   OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
67   A study regarding corresponding (or balanced) CIIs is made in para 3 (the risk-based approach) 
below. 
68   OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. MN NJOTINI    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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vulnerable  to  cyber-attacks.
69  Emergency  warning systems or network s  such as 
intrusion detection systems (IDSs) play a significant  role in the identification and 
classification of attacks on CIIs. IDSs must operate as a second line of defence,
70 
following prevention.
71 Furthermore, IDSs must encompass, amongst other things, 
computer software that "automates the intrusion detection process".
72  
 
IDSs must assist in an incident-monitoring process.
73 Such a process would identify 
and classify the threat or risk and analyse the degree and extent of the risk(s) posed 
to a system or network.
74 Once this has been done, information related to the risk(s) 
should be shared and exchanged , nationally or internationally, as a means  of 
establishing a co-operative framework with the purpose of securing CIIs.
75  
 
3.1.3  Response 
 
Timely or immediate and co-operative response to attacks on CIIs is indispensable to 
the process of securing CIIs.
76 Procedures and measures to facilitate  this rapid and 
effective collaboration should be established. Such partnerships can be achieved by 
setting up malicious packet alerts (MPAs), for example,  which are warning alerts
77 
that generally observe and report attacks on CIIs.
78 The procedures and measures 
taken in this regard should  support, amongst other  things,  the  establishment  of 
computer  emergence  response  team s  (CERTs)  or  computer  security  incident 
response teams (CSIRTs).
79 These CERTs or CSIRTs must  be composed of trained 
professionals
80 who should be able to investigate and provide information on present 
                                                 
69   OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
70   See Bolzoni and Etalle "Approaches in Anomaly-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems" 1-2. 
71   Scarfone and Mell 2007 http://1.usa.gov/ZwIkbb. 
72   Scarfone and Mell 2007 http://1.usa.gov/ZwIkbb. 
73   Scarfone and Mell 2007 http://1.usa.gov/ZwIkbb. 
74   Baocun and Fei "Information Warfare" 328; Brazzoli "Future Prospects of Information Warfare" 
219. 
75   OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
76   OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
77   Carcano et al "State-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems" 139. 
78   Carcano et al "State-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems" 139. 
79   Nickolov 2005 Information & Security 109. 
80   Rittinghouse and Hancock Cybersecurity Operations 327. MN NJOTINI    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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and future attacks or risks to CIIs.
81 Consequently, the CERTs or CSIRTs must be 
structured in a manner that allows them to  assist in  the monitoring, warning and 
alerting of attacks, and must be able to carry out CII recovery measures.
82  
 
The efficiency and useful functioning of the CERTs and/or CSIRTs must therefore be 
continuously evaluated. Put differently,  the CERTs or CSIRTs  must be repeatedly 
tested and assessed to ensure their proper operation. This testing and assessment 
must be aimed at  guaranteeing that these CERTs or CSIRTs remain   secure and 
stable in emergency situations.
83 
 
3.1.4  Recovery 
 
The OECD regards incident recovery measures (IRMs) as essential in alleviating the 
impact of attacks on CIIs.
84 IRMs generally bring operational and functional stability 
to CIIs. Furthermore, IRMs provide measures related to the recovery processes and 
progression or improvement of conditions after the attack.
85 For this reason, IRMs 
ease and accelerate the process of recovering information or data lost after attacks 
to CIIs.
86 It is important, however, that the structure of IRMs should not be such as 
to interrupt the appropriate functioning of CIIs.
87  
 
Incident  recovery  measures  can  establish the extent of the attacks to CIIs. The 
rationale for such investigation is to consider existing attack(s) trends. Such scrutiny 
may lead to the ability to forecast future threats to CIIs.  
 
                                                 
81   Rittinghouse and Hancock Cybersecurity Operations 327. 
82   OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
83   Principles V and VIII of the G8 Principles (G8 2003 http://bit.ly/128xThV). 
84   Principle X of the G8 Principles (G8 2003 http://bit.ly/128xThV). 
85   Chandrasekhar "Living With Disasters" 195. 
86   Anderson et al 2005 IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 1924. 
87   Anderson Information Infrastructure 51-52. MN NJOTINI    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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3.2  The South African approach 
 
3.2.1  Background to the study 
 
CII security in South Africa is needed in order to safeguard e-systems and networks 
from outside attacks.  In particular, South Africa proposes that we should have a 
"vigilant and proactive approach" to the CII security structure.
88 Such an approach 
requires a constant, regular assessment and forecasting of attacks on CIIs.
89  
 
It is argued that the requirement for the regular assessment of attacks  on CIIs in 
South Africa is analogous to the  identification and verification procedure which  is 
practised  by  FICA.
90  FICA  requires  certain  institutions,  that  is,  accountable 
institutions,
91  to  undertake  the  identification  and  verification  process  before 
establishing a business relationship
92 or concluding a transaction between parties
93 
or a single transaction
94 with other persons or institutions.
95 Such a process has to 
be  recurrent  and  continuous.
96  The  purpose  of  the  process   is  twofold.  Firstly, 
enables accountable institutions to detect any changes in the activities or behaviour 
                                                 
88   The South African Cybersecurity Policy 11 (GN 118 GG 32963 of 19 Feb 2010). 
89   The South African Cybersecurity Policy 11 (GN 118 GG 32963 of 19 Feb 2010). 
90   See s 21 Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (hereinafter referred to as FICA). 
91   Accountable institutions are those listed in Schedule 1 of FICA. Included in the list are attorneys, 
boards  of  executors  or  trust  companies,  estate  agents,  financial  instruments  traders, 
management companies, persons who carry on the business of banks, mutual banks, persons 
who carry on long-term insurance businesses, persons who carry on business in respect of which 
a gambling licence is issued, persons who carry on the business of dealing in foreign exchange, 
persons who carry on the business of lending money, persons who carry on the business of 
rendering investment advice or investment-broking services, persons who issue, sell or redeem 
travellers’  cheques,  money  orders  or  similar  instruments,  Postbanks,  members  of  the  stock 
exchange,  the  Ithala  Development  Finance  Corporation  Limited,  persons  who  have  been 
approved  or  who  fall  within  the  category  of  persons  approved  by  the  Registrar  of  Financial 
Markets, and persons who carry on the business of a money remitter. 
92   FICA defines a business relationship as an arrangement between two or more parties which is 
entered into for the purpose of concluding transactions on a regular basis (s 1 FICA). 
93   A  transaction  is  a  transaction  which  is  concluded  by  or  between  two  or  more  parties  in 
accordance with the type of business relationship carried out (s 1 FICA). 
94   Section 1  FICA defines a single transaction as  a transaction other than a transaction which is 
concluded in the course of a business relationship. 
95   Sections 21(1) and (2) of FICA. 
96   Columbus Joint Venture v Absa Bank Ltd  2002 1 All SA 105 (SCA); Energy Measurements (Pty) 
Ltd v First National Bank of  South Africa 2000 2 All SA 396 (W);  Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v 
Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 1 All SA 411 (A). MN NJOTINI    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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of the person or people it has established business relationships with.
97 Secondly, it 
identifies any alterations or modifications in the pattern of concluding transactions or 
single transactions.
98 It is therefore inferred that the  FICA approach to assessing 
transaction or single transactions on a continuous  basis has shaped the framework 
that South Africa is adopting to evaluate CII protection measures.  
 
An overview of the South African structure to safeguard CIIs is set out below. The 
section below describes in general terms the approach that South Africa is adopting 
to assess and forecast attacks on CIIs. 
 
3.2.2  The Chapter IX structure 
 
Chapter IX of the  ECT Act  provides  and/or seeks to provide measures for the 
deterrence of attacks on CIIs. In particular, sections 53, 54 and  55 of the ECT Act 
grant the Minister extensive powers to design measures to avert cyber -attacks. For 
example, the Minister decides on the data that should be identified and classified as 
essential to the protection of the national security of South Africa .
99 The Minister 
furthermore  sets  out  measures  to  ascertain  and  classify  the  data  that  are 
fundamental to the protection of the economic and social wellbeing of South African 
citizens.
100 Lastly, the Minister establishes procedures for the identification of s uch 
data.
101 
 
In other cases, the Minister prescribes rules for the registration and management of 
CIIs.
102 Firstly, the rules provide for the registration of the full names, address and 
contact details of the critical database administrator;
103 the location of CIIs or their 
                                                 
97   LIoyds Bank Ltd v The Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China 1928 All ER 285 297A-F. 
98   LIoyds Bank Ltd v The Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China 1928 All ER 285 297A-F. 
99   Section 53(a) ECT Act. 
100   Section 53(a) ECT Act. 
101   Section 53(b) ECT Act. 
102   Sectionss 54 and 55 ECT Act. 
103   A critical database administrator is a person who is responsible for the management and control 
of a critical database. See s 1 ECT Act. MN NJOTINI    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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component parts; and the general description of the information stored on CIIs.
104 A 
description of  the  information stored  on  CIIs  must,  however,  exclude the  actual 
contents  of  a  CII.
105  The  information  that  forms  the  basis  of  CIIs  must  be 
maintained by the Department
106 or any institution specified by the Minister for that 
purpose.
107  The Department or institution must therefore  refuse to disclose the  
information,  subject  to  certain  exceptions.
108  More  specifically,  the  information 
should be accessible only to the employees of the Department or institutions.
109 For 
purposes of  the  disclosure of critical information,  the term  "employees"  excludes 
"general  employees".
110  The  employees  refer  to  as  being  able  to  hold  the 
information are those are responsible for the keeping of the register.
111  
 
Secondly, the rules regarding the management of CIIs relate, amongst other things, 
to the accessing, transferring and controlling of  CIIs; infrastructural and procedural 
rules  and  requirements  for  securing  the  integrity  of   CIIs;  procedures  and 
technological methods to be used in storing and archiving  CIIs; disaster recovery 
plans in the event of  the loss or destruction of CIIs or their component parts, and 
any other matter required for the adequate protection, management an d control of 
CIIs.
112  
 
Section 55(2) of the ECT Act furthermore introduces a procedure or mechanism for 
the management of other CIIs. These other CIIs include databases administered by 
public bodies. Section 55(2) states that such management should be  performed in 
consultation with the members of the Cabinet affected by Chapter IX of the ECT Act. 
Examples of these members include, amongst others, the Minister of Defence, the 
Minister of Police and the Minister of State Security.  
                                                 
104   Section 54(2)(a)-(c) ECT Act. The recording of these particulars may, however, be waived at the 
Minister’s discretion in terms of s 55(2)(a) and (b) ECT Act. 
105   Section 54(2)(c) ECT Act. 
106   In terms of the  ECT Act this is the South African Department of Communications. S ee s 1 ECT 
Act. 
107   Section 54(2) ECT Act. 
108   Section 56(1) ECT Act. For an interesting study of the exceptions to the rule that information 
contained in the register should be kept secret, see s 56(2)(a)-(e) ECT Act. 
109   Section 56(1) ECT Act. 
110   Section 56(1) ECT Act. 
111   Section 56(1) ECT Act. 
112   Section 55(1)(a)-(f) ECT Act. MN NJOTINI    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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It is argued that an approach to secure CIIs functions adequately in an environment 
where a risk-based or sensitive framework is adopted. This risk-based framework is 
recognised  inter  alia  by  the  OECD.  More  specifically,  the  OECD  principles  or 
guidelines contain provisions related to the conducting of a risk-assessment-based 
analysis.
113  The risk-assessment-based analysis assists in ascertaining the degree 
and extent of the risks to critical information security measures.
114 Section 4 below 
therefore  reviews  the  risk-based  theory.  In  addition,  section  4  examines  the 
approaches to the risk-assessment-based analysis which are adopted by the OECD 
and, to some extent, by South Africa. More specifically, Chapter IX of the ECT Act 
embodies the South African structure to protect critical database s. The Chapter IX 
structure to secure CIIs or databases is supported by certain provisions of the Draft 
Cybersecurity Policy of South Africa.
115 
 
4  The risk-based theory 
 
4.1  The nature of the risk-based theory 
 
The  risk-based  theory  of  regulation  was  developed  recently.  Other  theories 
developed  recently  are,  inter  alia,  the  codes-based  theory  of  regulation,
116  the 
institutionalist theory of regulation, the systems theory of regulation
117  and the 
"Good Regulator Theorem."
118 The risk-based theory of regulation is referred to in 
fields  such  as  internal  auditing  as  the  risk  management  process.
119  The  risk 
management  process  is  normally associated with  "precautionary logic",
120  which 
posits that the state should extend  "freedom and security by intervening in ways 
                                                 
113   OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
114   OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
115   See  Procl  R118  in  GG  32962  of  19  February  2010  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  Draft 
Cybersecurity Policy of South Africa). 
116   The codes-based theory of regulation was developed by Lessig. See Lessig Code and Other Laws 
of Cyberspace; Lessig 1995 Yale L J 17-46. 
117   The institutionalist and the systems theories of regulation were promoted by Morgan and Yeung. 
See in general, Morgan and Yeung Law and Regulation 53-75. 
118   The "Good Regulator Theorem" is favoured by Conant and Ashby. See  Conant and Ashby 1970 
Int J Syst Sci 89. 
119   Spencer Internal Auditing Handbook 175. 
120   Bowling, Marks and Murphy "Crime Control Technologies" 52. MN NJOTINI    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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that pre-empt wrongdoing."
121 Accordingly, risk management is a forceful process 
that seeks to: 
 
Identify, assess, manage, and control potential events or situations, to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of the organisation’s objectives.
 122 
 
The risk management framework depends and/or relies on establishing the source or 
sources of the risks and/or threats.
123 It extends to identifying inter alia the type of 
risks  at issue,  and  asking  if  the risks  could  affect a specific event or process.
124 
Furthermore, risk management enables organisations and sometimes individuals to 
direct or allocate organisational and individual resources to high-risk areas.
125 
 
The notion "risk" derives from the Italian verb risicare,
126 which means "to dare".
127 
The verb  risicare  is  used in the Italian proverb  chi non risica, non rosica  which 
translates  in  English  into  "nothing  ventured,  nothing  gained ".
128  Some  scholars 
believe  that  the   idea  of  risk  was  serious ly  considered  during  the  Italian 
Renaissance,
129 when the concept of risk  was developed as mathematically astute 
gamblers sought to "unlock the mysteries of dice throwing".
130 
 
This paper submits that the structure of the risk-based theory is comparable to the 
risk management framework. For example, the risk -based theory discards a one-
size-fits-all approach to regulation and accepts that a holistic and elastic regulatory 
framework is indispensable. This framework focuses on the  number and degree of 
risks related to a particular event. It presupposes that certain facts or circumstances 
are unknown, and that the unknown facts should be evaluated by means of a risk -
                                                 
121   Bowling, Marks and Murphy "Crime Control Technologies" 52. 
122   Griffiths, O’Callaghan and Roach Internal Relations 251. 
123   Somsen "Cloning Trojan Horses" 223. 
124   Spencer Internal Auditing Handbook 179. 
125   For an interesting study on the "fundamentals of the framework for risk criteria" , see Vrijling et 
al 2004 Journal of Risk Research 570-574. 
126   Deuchars International Political Economy 7. 
127   Deuchars International Political Economy 7. 
128   Griffiths, O’Callaghan and Roach Internal Relations 251. 
129   Griffiths, O’Callaghan and Roach Internal Relations 251. 
130   Griffiths, O’Callaghan and Roach Internal Relations 251. MN NJOTINI    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
 
467 / 536 
 
assessment-appraisal  process
131  which  encompasses,  inter alia,  risk identification, 
risk  classification  and  risk  analysis.
132  The  risk-assessment-appraisal  process 
accordingly is opposed to  the idea of relying on  "intuition and guesswork" as the 
basis for assessing risks.
133 
 
Lastly, the risk-based theory presupposes that a fitting method of regulating facts or 
circumstances is to investigate and scrutinise those facts or circumstance s.
134 This 
scrutiny  is  commonly  made  by  applying  measures  (preventative  or  otherwise) 
notwithstanding the absence of facts to determine the outcome.
135 The foundation 
for such a scrutiny is to strike equilibrium between the taking of the measures and 
the identification of  the  imminent risks.
136  In other words, a balance should be 
maintained or sought to be maintained between the  number  and extent of the 
measures and the  number and degree of the risks. Therefore, in cases where the 
risks are high, stricter measures to prevent or deter the risks should be applied. 
 
The OECD and to some extent, the South African structures to safeguard CIIs reveal 
that  a risk-assessment-based analysis is  indispensable  to the general scheme to 
protect  CIIs.  The  sections  below,  namely  sections  4.2  and  4.3,  will  therefore 
examine both the OECD and the South African approaches to the risk -assessment-
based analysis. 
 
4.2  The OECD approach to the risk-assessment-based analysis 
 
The OECD encourages awareness of the risks to CII security.
137 This awareness is, 
according to the OECD, to be sustained in circumstances where a risk-assessment-
based analysis is carried out. The OECD therefore demands that  such an analysis 
should be broad-based. In other words, the risk -assessment-based analysis must 
                                                 
131   Afzal, Rohaniand and Roshana 2011 ISBEIA 320. 
132   Afzal, Rohaniand and Roshana 2011 ISBEIA 320. 
133   See Macaulay 2009 http://bit.ly/14AqrQM. 
134   Spedding Due Diligence 40. 
135   Spedding Due Diligence 40. 
136   Spedding Due Diligence 40. 
137   OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh; OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. MN NJOTINI    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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encompass the relevant internal and external factors that have an impact on CIIs.
138 
These factors include, amongst others,  technology, physical and human factors, 
policies, and third-party services with security implications.
139 Furthermore, the risk-
assessment-based analysis is required to include information components supporting 
CIIs; information infrastructures supporting the essential components of a nation’s 
business;  and  information  infrastructures  indispensable  to  a  country’s  national 
economy.
140 
 
The awareness of the risks to CIIs must therefore encourage the developing of 
preventive measures.
141  Furthermore, the requisite awareness must promote the 
undertaking  of  steps  to  enhance  the  security  of  information  systems  and 
networks.
142  Put  differently,  the  risk -assessment-based  analysis  must  assist  i n 
determining the levels of risks and  must also aid in the selection of suitable risk 
management controls.
143 An ongoing or periodic review structure must  therefore be 
developed. This structure must assist in re-examining and revaluating the measures 
developed to safeguard CIIs.
144  The review procedures must be  structured  in a 
manner that adequately addresses the risks  or threats associated with the constant 
developments in modern ICTs.  
 
4.3  The South African approach to the risk-assessment-based analysis 
 
The  South  African  structure  to  secure  CIIs  seems  to  diverge  from  that  which  is 
championed by the OECD. For example, no clear and/or ascertainable measures are 
set out by South Africa regarding the risk-assessment-based analysis. South Africa, it 
further appears, favours and/or adopts a generalised view in respect of the risk-
assessment-based  analysis.  This  paper,  on  the  contrary,  argues  that  a  risk-
assessment-based analysis should be a necessary component of any model designed 
                                                 
138   OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh. 
139   OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
140   OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
141   OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
142   OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
143   OECD 2002 http://bit.ly/14Ar0tG. 
144   OECD 2008 http://bit.ly/11cZ1xh. MN NJOTINI    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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to protect CIIs in the provisions of the South African National Cybersecurity Policy. 
For example, South Africa provides that relevant tools, policies, security concepts 
and  safeguards,  risk  management  approaches,  actions,  training,  best  practices, 
assurances  and  technologies  that  can  be  used  to  protect  the  cyber-environment, 
organisations  and  user  assets  should  be  collected.  Consequently,  policies  and 
procedures  facilitating  such  collection  should  be  developed.  The  framework  and 
ambit of the abovementioned policies and procedures should, however, be to secure 
the  South  African  cyberspace  structure.  This  structure  should  include  physical  or 
non-physical  terrains  which  are  created  or  composed  of  computers,  computer 
systems,  networks,  and  their  computer  programs,  computer  data,  content  data, 
traffic data, and users.
145 
 
Notwithstanding the abovementioned, this paper argues that there are a number of 
barriers to  South  Africa’s  progress  towards  establishing  a  risk-assessment-based 
analysis  as  part  of  its  scheme  to  safeguard  CIIs.  Firstly,  the  fact  that  the 
Cybersecurity  Policy  is  still  in  its  drafting  phase  obstructs  South  Africa’s  overall 
agenda  to  curb  cybercrime.  Secondly,  the  general  provisions  contained  in  the 
Cybersecurity Policy could be thought to support the adoption of a one-size-fits-all 
framework. Consequently, South Africans could be falsely persuaded that CIIs could 
be protected by merely ticking boxes.
146 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
South Africa has made great strides to protect CIIs. The South African approach is 
one that encourages the adoption of a model which requires the regular assessment 
of  attacks  or  threats  of  attacks  to  its  CIIs.  Accordingly,  it  is  argued  that  this 
approach is a representation of the identification and verification procedure that is 
found in FICA. Nevertheless, it is argued that the South African approach is rule-
based as opposed to risk-based. Put differently, it implicitly promotes an inflexible 
and incongruous culture of protecting critical databases. For example, it is submitted 
                                                 
145   The South African National Cybersecurity Policy (GN 118 GG 32963 of 19 Feb 2010). 
146   The proposal for a one-size-fits-all approach to a process to identify and classify CIIs is implicitly 
advocated by Von Solms. See Von Solms "Securing the Internet" 2-3. MN NJOTINI    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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that the evolution of attacks or threats of attacks to CIIs is linked to developments in 
contemporary technologies. Accordingly, the emergence of new technology brings 
about or can bring about the emergence of new attacks or threats of attacks on 
CIIs. Fixed rules or regulatory frameworks will  fail to deal adequately with these 
regular developments. It is  furthermore argued  that South  Africa should  adopt  a 
generalised approach in regulating the risks posed or potentially posed by outside 
attacks to CIIs. For example, no specific provisions can be found that to regulate the 
aforementioned. Only an inference can be drawn from various provisions that are 
contained in the Draft Cybersecurity Policy. Consequently, South Africa fails to follow 
the coordinated approach found in many instruments of the OECD.  
 
Therefore,  it  is  recommended  that  South  Africa  should  adopt  the  four  essential 
principles or elements that form the basis of the OECD’s structure to safeguard CIIs. 
The adoption of these OECD principles would enable South Africa to undertake a 
process to forecast, identify, assess, monitor, and recover from, attacks or threats of 
attacks  to  its  CIIs.  Furthermore,  South  Africa  should  accept  that  risks  of  attacks 
differ in terms of their degree and size. Consequently, a method to forecast, identify, 
assess, monitor and recover from, risks of attacks will generally diverge according to 
their pervasive or critical nature. It is furthermore recommended that regulations, 
ordinances or guidelines should be suited to the nature of the threats as described 
above. The aim should be to alleviate the impact of new attacks or threats of attacks 
to  CIIs,  owing  to  the  constant  developments  in  technologies.  The  regulations, 
ordinances or guidelines should generally promote a culture of protecting CIIs which 
examines the foreseen and unforeseen, or foreseeable and unforeseeable risks of 
attacks to CIIs.  MN NJOTINI    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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